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Review Essay 
Law, Economics, and 
the Skeleton of Value Fallacy 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 
Edited by Cass R. Sunstein t 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp.vii, 
431. $69.95 cloth. 
Reviewed by Kyron Huigens tt 
INTRODUCTION 
Generations of art students and English majors fulfilling distribution 
requirements have endured introductory economics courses, sitting in the 
back of the room doubting, sometimes out loud, the value of predictions 
and analyses that are premised on the ludicrously truncated conception of 
humanity known as homo economicus. Generations of economics 
instructors patiently have tried to explain the principle of parsimony, and 
the sound trade-off between the simplifications of homo economicus and 
the production of elegant, powerful explanations of complex social 
phenomena. 
It turns out that those artsy types have a point after all. Experiments 
show that, even in stripped-down settings, in which the true path to 
preference satisfaction is perfectly obvious, real people do not behave at all 
in the way that economists have supposed they do. 1 In one experiment, a 
group of subjects is given an everyday item (such as a mug or a set of pens) 
to which a value has been assigned by the researcher. They are then 
instructed to trade with another group that has been given cash, knowledge 
of the assigned values, and no item. The subjects who start with the items 
tend to hang on to them well beyond the point at which they would be 
made better off by trading. In another set of experiments, people faced with 
Copyright © 2001 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Incorporated (CLR) is a 
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their 
publications. 
t Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 
tt Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Thanks are due to the 
members of the California Law Review for their insightful editorial assistance. 
I . The experiments described in this paragraph are discussed more fully, infra Part II. 
537 
538 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:537 
an offer that will clearly make them better off if they accept, and provide 
them nothing if they refuse, refuse offers that are profitable but not fair. 
The experimental subjects' failure to pursue their self-interest has not 
caused economics departments to pack it in. Nevertheless, it poses serious 
challenges. The first experiment mentioned above, for example, suggests 
an "endowment effect," which contradicts the Coase Theorem: the notion 
that, in the absence of transaction costs, goods will find their most efficient 
distribution regardless of their initial assignment. 2 
Cass Sunstein has collected a set of essays by economists and legal 
scholars exploring these challenges, in a volume entitled Behavioral Law 
and Economics. This review will argue that the objections of the art student 
and the English major still have not been met. This prospect will not cause 
the authors in this collection any embarrassment because none of them sets 
out to meet these objections. Their objective is to refine the tools of 
economic analysis, not to defend economics against a fundamental but 
seemingly sophomoric challenge. Nevertheless, in the course of refining 
the economic conception of practical rationality,3 the authors of this vol-
ume instead uncover reasons to abandon it. Ultimately, these 
considerations undermine the economic analysis of law, and indicate the 
need for a fundamental re-orientation of legal theory. The issues raised in 
Behavioral Law and Economics call for a greater appreciation of the nature 
of value and judgment, and they suggest that scholars should focus on the 
law's production of states of character rather than states of affairs.4 
The support that behavioral economics inadvertently lends to 
objections to economic rationality is more than an ironic curiosity. In the 
volume's lead essay, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, Cass 
Sunstein, Christine Jolls, and Richard Thaler propose to examine the ways 
in which real people differ from homo economicus, and to explore the 
implications of these differences for law and economics (pp. 14-15). They 
describe three "bounds" on human behavior: bounded rationality, bounded 
willpower, and bounded self-interest (pp. 14-16). "Bounded rationality" 
refers to the limit on our ability to remember and to compute accurately; 
"bounded willpower" refers to our chronic inability to serve our own long 
term interests even when we recognize them; and "bounded self-interest" 
refers to the fact that people "care, or act as if they care, about others, even 
strangers, in some circumstances" (p. 16). The authors promise, on their 
own behalf and implicitly on behalf of the authors of the essays that follow, 
an inquiry that will "draw into question the central ideas of utility 
2. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. l (1960). 
3. The term "practical reasoning" refers generally to the valuations, rational responses to value, 
and motivations that contribute to action. 
4 . See discussion infra Part Ill. 
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maximization, stable preferences, rational expectations, and optimal 
processing of information" (p. 14). 
This project is both too timid and too bold. The timidity is evident in 
the parenthesis that follows the above-quoted description of bounded self-
interest: "(Thus, we are not questioning here the idea of utility 
maximization, but rather the common assumptions about what that 
entails)" (p. 16). Having been promised an inquiry that will draw utility 
maximization into question, the reader is left to wonder where, if not in 
connection with the assumption of self-interestedness, the critique of utility 
maximization will occur. The answer is nowhere and everywhere. 
Throughout this volume, the contributors again and again bump up against 
reasons to discard this and other premises of economic thought. And again 
and again the authors either fail to realize the scope of their own 
discoveries or simply are at a loss over what to say about them. If this blind 
spot or hesitation is due to their reluctance to undermine the foundations of 
law and economics as a discipline, then they have been too bold. 
Sunstein, Jolls, and Thaler's statement that self-interest is limited be-
cause people care, or act as if they care, about others, is a good illustration 
of this ambivalence. People do care about one another, and they act 
accordingly. The authors' apostrophe "or act as if they care" (p. 16), how-
ever, suggests that this caring behavior can be reduced to self-interested 
behavior (presumably through an analysis of reputation effects5), thus 
saving legal economists the trouble of understanding the implications of 
caring behavior on its own terms. But caring behavior cannot be reduced to 
self-interested behavior, and neither can other, commonly observed non-
optimizing behavior such as honoring family and friends, living out a per-
sonal narrative, expressing an emotion, or nurturing a virtuous character.6 
5. E.g., Ian Ayres & Stewart Schwab, The Employment Contract, 8 KAN. ].L. & PUB. PoL'Y 71, 
78 (I 999) ("For example, until recently, IBM carefully nurtured a reputation for caring for its workers, 
including a policy of no layoffs."). 
6. A number of philosophers recently have examined, broadly speaking, the rationality of non-
optimizing behavior of this kind. E.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND EcoNOMICS 
(1993); ROSALIND HURsrHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999); Christine M. Korsgaard, Skepticism About 
Practical Reason, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDs 31 I (1996); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LovE's 
KNOWLEDGE (1990); JusrIN OAKLEY, MORALITY AND THE EMOTIONS (1992); JOSEPH RAz, THE 
MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); MICHAEL SLOTE, BEYOND OnIMIZING: A STUDY OF RATIONAL 
CHOICE (1989); MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES 338-42 (1990); Christine 
Swanton, Satisficing and Virtue, 90]. PHIL. 33, 40 (1993). In legal scholarship, this discussion has 
proceeded under the heading of expressive rationality. E.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory 
of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 
146 U. PA. L. REv. 1235, 1261-63 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, I 13 
HARV. L. REV. 413, 419-25 (1999); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 591, 597-601 (1996) [hereinafter Alternative Sanctions]; Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of 
Value in Legal Thought, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1520 passim (1992); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, 
Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, " and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances 
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483, 506-16 (1993); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, 
Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 
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A serious inquiry into the ways in which people actually do value, choose, 
and act is bound to uncover not only the existence of this non-optimizing 
behavior, but also its resistance to economic reduction. But what is a self-
respecting legal economist to do when she reaches this point? Join the 
motley opposition? 
The opposition to law and economics is well described as motley, be-
cause it is a far less discrete, cohesive school of thought than the law and 
economics movement, and also because the arguments against law and 
economics as an enterprise are not easily summarized, and have rarely been 
persuasively articulated. As Jeanne Schroeder has pointed out: "The critical 
left tends to take legal economics' claim to rationality at face value and, 
therefore, frequently engages in the self-defeating strategy of attempting to 
form rational arguments against rationality."7 As a starting point in this 
Review Essay, I will summarize one line of controversy that bears directly 
on the issues of "realism" that the essays in Behavioral Law and 
Economics address. Part I uses a hypothetical dialogue between a believer 
and nonbeliever in the law and economics approach to frame the criticism 
suggested in the preceding paragraph; namely, that economics purports to, 
but cannot, reduce all practical reasoning to the terms of self-interested 
behavior. Nor does the part of practical reasoning that economics does rec-
ognize constitute a representative or essential core of sound practical 
reasoning. I refer to this defect as the skeleton of value fallacy, for reasons 
that will appear below. 
Part II of this Review Essay examines several instances of the 
skeleton of value fallacy in Behavioral Law and Economics. This Part fo-
cuses on the endowment effect and its implications for the Coase Theorem. 
Two of the younger contributors to the volume grasp the implications of 
the endowment effect more fully than their elders do, but the result of this 
insight is to leave the arguments of both scholars at a curious dead end. I 
argue that the next step they must take is a difficult one because it is 
incompatible with the core economic assumptions of utility maximization 
and transitive preferences.8 In other words, the pursuit of behavioral 
CoLUM. L. REv. 2121, 2143-66 (1990); Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of 
Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REv. 936, 938-39 (1991). 
7. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship, 79 OR. L. REV. 147, 
150 (2000). 
8. Transitivity of preferences means that ifB is preferable to A, and C is preferable to B, then C 
is preferable to A. Transitivity of preferences is a component of the economic conception of rationality, 
which has been summarized this way: 
For the economist, ... rationality means choosing in accordance with a preference ordering 
that is complete and transitive, subject to perfect and costlessly acquired information; where 
there is uncertainty about future outcomes, rationality means maximizing expected utility, 
that is, the utility of an outcome multiplied by the probability of its occurrence. 
MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF EcoNOMICS OR How ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN 229 (2d. ed. 1992). 
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economics leads to the discovery of good reasons not to do economics at 
all. 
Part III considers the implications of the skeleton of value fallacy, and 
of the contributors' failure to recognize it. This discussion focuses on the 
concepts of fairness and fault as they are portrayed by behavioral 
economists. I argue that economics distorts both concepts in ways that a 
behavioral approach cannot cure unless its proponents are willing to aban-
don consequentialism altogether.9 Consequences matter to the law, of 
course, but the essays in Behavioral Law and Economics give us reasons to 
shift focus away from states of affairs as such and toward matters of 
judgment and character. 
I 
ECONOMIST AND ANTI-ECONOMIST 
The common ground between the economist and one who believes 
that economic analysis is distorted, distorting, and false (call him the anti-
economist) is narrow or nonexistent. As a result, it seems easiest to lay out 
their differences in dialogue form. Therefore, as an introduction to the 
questions of value and rationality that concern us here, consider several 
rounds in the debate between the economist and the anti-economist. 
The Anti-Economist: Since I was an undergraduate, I have been struck 
by the inadequacy of economists' conception of value, and by your narrow 
and implausible premises about how and why people are motivated to act. 
You seem to be caught in the seventeenth century, sharing Hobbes's con-
viction that all normative claims are nothing more than elaborations of 
pleasure and pain.10 Your conception of rational response to value seems 
only slightly less antique in its insistence, reminiscent of Hume's, that 
reason's role in action is only to gauge the intensity of competing desires, 
seek the means to their satisfaction, discount for probabilities of success, 
and pull the trigger. 11 
This conception of value and rational response to value is actually 
widespread as a kind offolk-psychology12 of action. But the fact is that few 
9. The term "consequentialism" refers to a tradition in philosophical ethics that includes 
utilitarianism and neo-classical economics, among others. Consequentialism describes right action in 
terms of the promotion (maximization, optimization) of states of affairs such as utility, wealth, or social 
welfare. Philip Pettit, The Consequentialist Perspective, in MARCIA W. BARON ET AL. , THREE 
METHODS OF Ennes: A DEBATE 92, 129-33 (1997). 
10. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 39-40 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651) 
("But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth 
Good: And the object ofhis Hate, and Aversion, Evil/ . ... "). 
11. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 415 (L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch 
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739-1740) ("Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."). 
12. The term "folk-psychology'' refers to a widely and uncritically held set of beliefs about 
human psychology. It echoes the term "folkways" as coined by the sociologist William Graham 
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serious students of value and motivation take the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century interpretations seriously. Even philosophers who accu-
rately can be called neo-Humeans recognize that there is more to value and 
rational action than desire and its satisfaction.13 I have never been able to 
decide whether economists actually adhere to these outmoded theories, 14 or 
whether they rely on the superficial plausibility of this folk-psychology 
opportunistically, to bolster the public credibility of economics as a 
discipline. 
The Economist: Your mistake is to assume that economists have or 
need a psychological theory of value. On the contrary, economics doesn't 
make any claims about how people value things, or why they do what they 
do. Economics is based only on the observation that people do, in fact, 
choose one thing over another. Economic theory is agnostic about how or 
why this occurs. 15 To call the notion of observed preferences a theory of 
value is much too grand a title for a simple, straightforward step in 
economic analysis. 
Your alternative, if I have read the anti-economic literature correctly, 
is an elaborate theory of value that glorifies irrationality. The claim is made 
that valuations are incommensurable; in other words, that value cannot be 
reduced to a single measure such as utility or wealth or preference-
satisfaction.16 To me, this claim implies that important choices are made 
arbitrarily and that significant actions are taken for no good reason, 
Sumner. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS 3-4 (2d ed. 1913) (coining the term "folkways" to 
describe the widely and uncritically held beliefs that constitute the mores of a society). 
13. E.g., GERALD F. GAUS, VALUE AND JUSTIFICATION: THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL THEORY 
80-203 (1990) (setting forth a neo-Humean theory of value); MICHAEL SMITH, THE MoRAL PROBLEM 
92-129 (1995) (setting forth a neo-Humean theory of motivation); Bernard Williams, Internal and 
External Reasons, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, 1973-1980, at IOI, 102-04 (1981) 
( describing deliberations over and adjustments to one's "motivational set" as part of a neo-Humean 
conception of motivation); Philip Pettit & Michael Smith, Practical Unreason , 102 MIND 53 (1993) 
( describing practical reasoning as the consonance of deliberative reasons and desire). 
14. For example, Gary Becker advances the Hobbesian and Humean views of value and 
motivation when he writes: 
The economic approach to human behavior is not new, even outside the market sector. Adam 
Smith often (but not always!) used this approach to understand political behavior. Jeremy 
Bentham was explicit about his belief that the pleasure-pain calculus is applicable to all 
human behavior: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to 
determine what we shall do .. . . They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think." 
GARY s. BECKER, THE EcONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 8 (1976) (quoting ]E~MY 
BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION I (J. H. Burns & H. 
L. A. Hart eds. Athlone Press 1970) (1780)). 
15. Martin Hollis & Robert Sugden, Rationality in Action, 102 MIND I, 2-7 (1993) (describing 
economic theory's disavowal of psychological premises in the theory of revealed preferences); cf PAUL 
A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS 90-92 (enlarged ed. 1983) (discussing the 
economic concept of a preference). 
16. See ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 23-26, 55-56 (describing the incommensurability of value); 
RAz, supra note 6, at 328-35 (distinguishing and describing the relationship between rough equality of 
value and incommensurability of value). 
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because we do make hard choices between competing ends.17 People 
usually pursue the satisfaction of their preferences in a consistent fashion, 
and they must necessarily treat disparate and dissimilar values as commen-
surate when they do so. 18 So these claims about incommensurability seem 
to be empirically false. To be sure, people are irrational at times. They 
make decisions based on whim, prejudice, habit, and so on. In these in-
stances people do not exhibit consistent preference orderings. But it seems 
misguided to treat these decisions as anything other than aberrational and 
self-defeating. Whatever our preferences might be, we can coordinate and 
satisfy them to the greatest extent possible and, presumably, this is what we 
wish to do. Insisting on supposed incommensurabilities only confuses and 
thwarts this enterprise. 
The Anti-Economist: Your argument confuses incommensurability 
with incomparability. To say that values are context-dependent, plural, and 
incommensurable is only to deny that they can be ranked along a single 
metric. It is not to deny that competing values can be rationally compared 
or that rational choices between them are possible. 19 
Incidentally, this is the point at which your antique and impoverished 
theory of value comes to the fore. Your insistence that choice between 
competing ends "necessarily" entails commensurability of value, and your 
frank admission that you cannot conceive of any other basis for a rational 
choice, reflect your conviction that valuations, or "preferences" as you call 
them, are rationally comparable only on the score of intensity. This is 
simply indistinguishable from the Hobbesian conception of value.20 It ig-
nores the fact that, while value is premised in emotion, emotion is not 
merely a feeling.21 Emotion has a cognitive dimension, and it can be 
assessed along parameters other than intensity.22 
17. See Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 995, 1062 (1989) (advancing the argument that values must be commensurable because, 
otherwise, rational decision making would be impossible). 
18. See Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Ruler of the World?, 
1995 UTAH L. REv. 683, 694-98 (arguing that apparent incommensurabilities can be resolved into 
interdependent utilities). 
19. See Ruth Chang, Comparison and the Justification of Choice, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1569, 
1588-91 (1998). 
20. See HOBBES, supra note 10. 
21. GAUS, supra note 13, at 49-56; ROBERT M. GoRDON, THE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS: 
INvESnGATIONS IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 21-44 (1987); Nico H. Frijda, Emotions Require 
Cognitions, Even if Simple Ones, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 197 (Paul 
Edman & Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994); Robert C. Roberts, What an Emotion Is: A Sketch, 97 PHIL. 
REv. 183, 185-90 (1988). 
22. RONALD DE SousA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION 173-90 (1987); ANDREW ORTONY ET 
AL. , THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS 15-17 (1988). For example, a person who expresses 
distress for the hurricane that is dissipating into an ordinary storm, while demonstrating indifference to 
the hurricane's human victims, meaningfully can be said to be mistaken in her emotions. GAUS, supra 
note 13, at 136. She could benefit from treatment in which she is challenged to defend these responses 
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Similarly, because values are premised in emotion, they can be 
assessed along any number of parameters other than intensity of feeling.23 
To take a classic example, if a father were to accept a large sum of money 
not to see or speak to his children for several months, his action would 
seem odd and inappropriate to most people and could be expected to carry 
some social stigma. 24 He might truthfully say that his desire for the cash 
was more intense than his desire for the time with his children, but this 
would hardly end the debate. In contrast, suppose a father were offered the 
same amount of money to do a challenging job that promised to be 
personally rewarding and of some value to society. He could accept the 
offer with little fear of social condemnation, even if the job required him to 
be out of communication with his family for several months. 
The difference in these two transactions reflects the difference 
between commensurability and comparability. The first father behaves as if 
time with his children and a cash payment could be brought under a single 
metric: the relative intensity of his desires. Of course there is nothing 
wrong with cash transactions as such, but we simply don't believe that the 
cash transaction is appropriate in this situation, resulting in the social con-
demnation of the father's action. In the second example, in which consid-
erations such as the pursuit of a profession and social good come into play, 
the father can defend his choice rationally. For example, he can reason that 
his children will benefit in the long run from his doing challenging and 
fulfilling work, not only materially, but from the example it provides of a 
serious person making sacrifices in a worthwhile pursuit. The notion of 
incommensurability is simply a way of cautioning against oversimplifying 
practical reasoning by collapsing decisions of the second kind into 
decisions of the first kind. There are real differences between these two 
fathers and the transactions in which they engage, differences that are due 
to the context-dependence, pluralism, and incommensurability of value. 
These differences explain the social condemnation of one choice and the 
social acceptance of the other. 
The Economist: It is tempting to insist that the two transactions do 
collapse into one another. It seems to me that the condemnation of the first 
father's decision to "sell" time with the kids is a bit of pretense and pos-
turing, while the second father's decision to take a job for the same amount 
of money involves a good bit of rationalization. The bottom line is that 
time at home with the kids does have a value that is commensurable with 
rationally. Id. at 31-34 (noting that psychotherapy assumes that emotions are cognitive); Pildes, supra 
note 6, at 1546 (same). 
23. See GAUS, supra note 13, at 106-26; ORTONY ET AL. , supra note 22, at 34-47; Andrew 
Ortony, Value and Emotion, in MEMORIES, THOUGHrS, AND EMOTIONS: EssAYS IN HONOR OF GEORGE 
MANDLER 337 (William Kessen et al. eds., 1991); cf DE SousA, supra note 22, at 218-20 (describing 
mistakes in desire as arising from mistakes about the aspect or character of the emotion). 
24. RAz, supra note 6, at 345-53 . 
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cash, even if part of that value comes in the form of enhanced reputation. 
It's just a question of how much is on offer. But as I say, to make this 
argument is only a temptation. It is one that I will resist because it would 
commit me to psychological premises that I just don't need. 
Even if I concede your main point, that values are comparable even if 
not commensurable, and that choices between incommensurable values can 
be made on a rational basis, economics can and does remain agnostic on 
the psychology of valuation. Whether they are rational or irrational, these 
choices are made and can be observed. Even if the father in your second 
example is sincere and truthful, he nevertheless exhibits his preferences in 
this transaction. I can satisfy your concern about oversimplification with a 
suitably elaborate description of these preferences. He has a preference, for 
example, for exposing his children to role models of people engaged in 
serious and rewarding work. This preference might not have a cash value, a 
point I don't concede, but it is an observable value that is traded against 
time at home in the second transaction. There is no reason to conclude that 
economic analysis is incapable of accurately describing and assessing his 
choices. 
The Anti-Economist: Your first argument has a couple of flaws, and 
perhaps you recognize one of them, since you decline to endorse it. But the 
other flaw in your first argument is one you apparently don't see, because it 
affects your second argument as well. 
The first flaw is, once again, the inadequacy of your conception of 
practical reasoning. You are tempted to argue that pretense and 
rationalization lie behind society's different reactions to the two fathers' 
transactions because you adhere to Hume's simple desire-belief model, in 
which desires remain untouched by reason.25 According to this model, 
moral beliefs in particular have no motivating force, and do seem to be 
little more than pretensions that are likely at any moment to be over-
whelmed by ordinary desires. Furthermore, these desires can be 
conditioned at a non-cognitive level. On this view, people are both oppor-
tunistic and manipulable, words never really match deeds, and cynicism is 
in order. Thankfully, there is ample reason to think that this primitive 
account of practical reasoning is simply mistaken, even if it survives as 
folk-psychology. 26 
The second flaw has to do with your insistence that everything has a 
cash value because some transaction at some price can always be imagined. 
Your error is to conflate price and value. We agree, I assume, that price 
and value are distinct and don't always match up. The question is when and 
why the disparity arises. Take an example. In the novel Sophie's Choice, 
25. See HUME, supra note 11. 
26. See GAUS, supra note 13, at 84-112; Korsgaard, supra note 6,passim; SMITH, supra note 13, 
at 16-59. 
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the main character arrives on the receiving dock at Auschwitz and is forced 
by a sadistic SS officer to choose which of her children will live, on pain of 
having both of them killed.27 In other words, she is forced to purchase her 
son's life at the price of her daughter's life. This price, of course, has 
nothing to do with the value of her children. The question is why not. You 
would say that the problem is unequal bargaining power: with the Nazi 
death machinery to back him up, ' the SS man can dictate this price. The 
failure of price to match value reflects a market failure, but you would 
insist that in a perfect market, price will always match value. 
In fact, however, the conceptual distinction between price and value 
can never be fully overcome no matter what the circumstances. Precisely 
because value is context-dependent and incommensurable, there is 
necessarily some unrealized value ~r some uncompensated-for loss of 
value in all actual choices. In other words, value has a tragic dimension. 
For example, say that Mary is born with extraordinary talent for both the 
piano and swimming. She can pursue both vocations up to a certain point. 
But if she wishes to achieve true excellence in either one, she must at some 
point devote herself fully to one vocation to the exclusion of the other. The 
necessary hours at the swimming pool are the same hours as those she 
would need to spend practicing her music. She cannot solve this dilemma 
about the course of her life by finding an optimal mix of piano playing and 
swimming that will give her the maximum attainable satisfaction. She is 
not motivated either to swim or to play by a prospect of generic satisfac-
tion; she is motivated in each enterprise by what it distinctively allows her 
to express and to be. These expressions and identities are not 
interchangeable, and there is no optimal mix of the two, because the value 
of excellence as a musician and the value of excellence as an athlete are 
incommensurable values. 
This is not an extraordinary situation; it is quotidian. If Styron's 
Sophie were allowed to live in peace, she would nevertheless face choices 
of this kind with her children. An hour spent drawing with her daughter is 
not an hour spent flying a kite with her son, and the choice between these 
actions is not a matter of optimizing the total amount of parental satisfac-
tion. Sophie's children are incommensurable in value; time spent with one 
child is incommensurable with time spent with the other. As a result, some 
value is lost in the course of choosing and acting. To call this loss the tragic 
dimension of value is not to say that choice is always a cause for grief. It is 
only to point out that the loss of value entailed by choice is a necessary 
feature of the human condition. 
Your faith that price will equal value in a perfect market reflects a 
failure to appreciate the tragic dimension of value. If, within an ordinarily 
complex practical context, I accept a price for something of value, time 
27. See WILLIAM STYRON, SoPHIE 0 S CHOICE 483-84 (1979). 
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with my children for example, this does not imply that the cash payment 
fully reflects this time 's value. Nor does it imply that any discrepancy must 
be due to some market failure; nor that this time is commensurable with the 
value of all other things, such as the rewards of a profession. On the con-
trary, there is unrealized and uncompensated-for value in these 
transactions, just as there is in any practical choice. It is a necessary feature 
of the human condition that I cannot have all that I want. Price and value 
are distinct because value has a tragic dimension and price does not, and 
this is not a gap that a perfect market or anything else can bridge. 
The recognition that value has a tragic dimension also undermines 
your insistence that the economist's treatment of revealed preferences is 
untouched by questions about the nature of value, and can fully describe 
the second father's choice. It is a persistent and odd feature of economic 
thinking that its practitioners insist they have no theoretical commitments, 
simply because they refuse to articulate them. Revealed preferences are 
evidence of valuations, and inferences from revealed preferences are 
claims about the values that lie behind actions. But the tragic dimension of 
value is invisible to revealed preference analysis because lost and unreal-
ized value is never revealed in choices made. Homo economicus is 
oblivious to the tragic dimension of value. But real people are all too aware 
of it, and it lies behind many non-optimizing features of their behavior. 
The Economist: Of course economic analysis does not reflect human 
rationality in all its detail. But homo economicus is not just a simplification 
of human reality, it is a parsimonious version of that reality. It is comprised 
only of those carefully selected assumptions about value, choice, and 
action that are not too complex to be useful in economic modeling, but that 
are sufficiently complex and accurate to allow that modeling to generate 
insight into and accurate predictions about human behavior. Naturally 
some features, such as the tragic dimension of value (if this exists) are not 
represented. Some detail is missing in the pictures thus produced, but the 
pictures are accurate in their essentials because the assumptions about 
value and choice cover the essentials of practical rationality. In fact, homo 
economicus is a flexible concept. It is conceived of differently by various 
economists engaged in various analyses, but in each instance the objective 
is an optimal complexity. The addition of the tragic dimension of value to 
homo economicus, even if it could be done and even if there were agree-
ment on what that concept means, would overburden economic analysis 
with a complexity that would not be justifiable in terms of increased 
accuracy of prediction or greater insight into behavior. 
The Anti-Economist: The argument that you have just made is one that 
I call the skeleton of value thesis. You admit to using an incomplete ver-
sion of practical rationality, but you contend that it captures the essence of 
practical rationality. The flesh and blood of human valuation and choice 
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are missing, but you claim to have captured at least the superstructure at 
the center of it all. The details can be draped over this superstructure later, 
if necessary, but you suppose that the account of choice and action is 
accurate at its core. 
This is a piece of essentialism that, like all essentialism, needs a 
strong supporting argument. But in this case the argument is lacking. You 
have selected features of human practical rationality for inclusion in your 
model on the basis of their utility in facilitating economic analysis. It is 
simply a non sequitur to say that these very features represent the essence 
of practical rationality, and that therefore the results of economic analysis 
are descriptively accurate. The error is compounded when these results are 
asserted to be so well-founded that they provide a uniquely reliable basis 
for public policy prescriptions. Because the skeleton of value thesis rests 
on this non sequitur, it is better described as the skeleton of value fallacy. 
How do you know that your parsimonious account has captured prac-
tical rationality in its essentials? On what ground have you concluded that 
optimizing behavior is sufficient for an accurate account of human motiva-
tion and action, and that non-optimizing behavior is not necessary? Some 
argument on this score is needed.28 Given your discipline's normative pre-
tensions, how do you justify leaving out of account such basic behavior as 
honoring family and friends, living out a personal narrative, expressing an 
emotion, or nurturing a virtuous character? Can you persuade us that you 
have not picked an incomplete set of practical rationality's features, so that 
your prescriptions are distorted, or that you have not chosen the wrong 
features, so that your normative claims are simply mistaken? 
The Economist: Of course I can. Again, you don't seem to appreciate 
economics as a scientific enterprise. The accuracy of these assumptions 
isn't something that can be, or needs to be, defended in the abstract. On the 
contrary, it is defended by concrete results. Like any scientific hypothesis, 
the construct of a rational economic actor is falsifiable: homo economicus 
is shown to be false if it fails accurately to predict human behavior. The 
accuracy of the construct, conversely, is demonstrated by its resistance to 
falsification, that is to say, by its success in predicting behavior. The proof 
you are asking for is to be found in the track record of the entire discipline. 
The Anti-Economist: The problem with that argument is that the 
economic conception of rationality isn't a hypothesis at all, but an axiom. 
Instead of testing homo economicus in deliberate attempts to disprove it, 
most economists spend their time generating elaborations of their 
28. But cf BECKER, supra note 14, at 153 ("[E]veryone more or less agrees that rational behavior 
simply implies consistent maximization of a well-ordered function, such as a utility or profit. 
function."). 
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arguments in order to preserve their premises against contrary evidence.29 
To take a notorious example from public choice theory, no self-interested, 
consistent maximizer of preferences would vote. Given that he is 
extraordinarily unlikely to cast the deciding vote, voting cannot possibly 
benefit him as much as virtually any alternative activity. 30 Nevertheless, 
people continue to vote in election after election. Far from revising their 
view that people are always utility maximizers, and considering explana-
tions for voting that don't make this assumption, economists of the public 
choice school have spent the last several decades defending the axiom of 
utility maximization against this falsifying evidence. They do this, not by 
subjecting revised hypotheses to testing, but by abstract argumentation that 
owes much to outmoded folk-psychology and little to science.31 
To give credit where credit is due, some economists have taken the 
construct of economic rationality as a hypothesis rather than a given. They 
have conducted experiments to determine whether, even in the simplest, 
pared-down, purely monetary settings for choice, the assumptions that 
comprise homo economicus accurately portray behavior. They have found 
that those assumptions are not accurate. Contrary to Coase, for example, 
initial assignments of property rights do affect their ultimate disposition, 
even in the absence of transaction costs. The only complaint I have about 
this work is that its full implications have not been articulated. These 
scholars see themselves as engaged in a quest for the optimally complex 
version of homo economicus, just as you describe it. But while they see 
themselves as adding sinew to the skeleton of value, they are in fact 
effectively dismantling it, and rightly so. 
II 
OVER-EXPERIMENTATION AND UNDER-ANALYSIS 
Several of the contributors to Behavioral Law and Economics, 
particularly those who have examined the endowment effect and its 
implications for the Coase Theorem, seem to be nascent anti-economists. 
They would deny this calumny, of course, but a more thorough and far-
reaching consideration of the implications of their iconoclastic experiments 
might give them reasons to consider such a career change. 
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler's essay, 
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 
examines the endowment effect (pp. 211-31 ). Suppose that each member of 
29. DONALD P . GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, THE PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A 
CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 33-46 (1994). 
30. Id. at 49-50 (citing ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) ; 
NORMAN FROELICH & ]OE A. OPPENHEIMER, MODERN POLITICAL EcONOMY (1978); GoROON 
TULLOCK, TOWARD A MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS (1967)). 
31. GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 29, at 47-71. 
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one group of subjects in an experiment is given a token that has no value 
other than a redemption value assigned to it in the experiment, according to 
a given scale. If these subjects are then instructed to trade with members of 
another group, each of whom has cash and information about the redemp-
tion value of a token, but no token, then about half of the tokens in the 
experiment will change hands. The median price for both buyers and 
sellers will be the median price on the assigned value scale. This "induced 
value" experiment tends to confirm the Coase Theorem, which states that 
the initial assignment of a property right has no effect on the ultimate 
distribution of that right (pp. 211,213). 
Suppose, however, that the tokens in this experiment are replaced with 
an item of minor value such as a coffee mug or a set of pens. The other 
conditions of the experiment remain unchanged. Each item has a redemp-
tion value assigned to it in the experiment according to a given scale, and 
subjects endowed with an item are instructed to trade with members of 
another group, each of whom has cash and information about the redemp-
tion value of an item, but no item. In this experiment, far fewer than half 
the items change hands. The median price demanded by sellers is 
significantly higher than the median price offered by buyers (pp. 216-20). 
The latter experiment tends to disprove the Coase Theorem, along 
with the standard explanations legal economists offer for real-world 
deviations from the theorem such as transaction costs or income effects (p. 
219). Initial assignments do matter: a phenomenon Richard Thaler dubbed 
the "endowment effect." The endowment effect is not due to transaction 
costs, because there are no more or different transaction costs in the coffee 
mug trials than in the induced value trials. Neither poor bargaining nor 
habits of strategic bargaining (whereby sellers might overstate their price 
and buyers undervalue goods) account for the endowment effect, because 
these distorting tendencies do not show up in the induced value trials and 
(more importantly) because the effect persists in repeated item trials with 
the same subjects, in which they have the incentive and opportunity to shed 
these tendencies. 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler reported these experiments, along 
with further refinements that also confirm the endowment effect, in a 1990 
paper reproduced in Behavioral Law and Economics (p. 211 ). The impor-
tance of their paper is difficult to overestimate, and its influence is evident 
throughout the volume. The authors were frank about contradicting the 
Coase Theorem, and did not hesitate to declare that "endowment effects 
and loss aversion [are] fundamental characteristics of preferences" (p. 
229). Nevertheless, their explanation for the endowment effect is hesitant 
and confused. They write: 
Some markets may share [ the features] of induced value markets, 
especially when the conditions of pure arbitrage are approached. 
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However, the computation of net gain and loss is not possible in 
other situations, for example, when risky prospects are traded for 
cash, or in markets where people sell goods that they also value for 
their use. In these conditions, the cancellation of the loss of the 
object against the dollars received is not possible because the good 
and money are not strictly commensurate. The valuation ambiguity 
produced by this lack of commensurability is necessary, although 
not sufficient, for both loss aversion and a buying-selling 
discrepancy (p. 226). 
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This passage seems, at first, to attribute the endowment effect to the kind 
of incommensurability that the anti-economist sees in value-rich practical 
contexts. If this were the case, then this analysis of the endowment effect 
would be a remarkable departure from standard economic thought. But 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler are not revolutionaries; they are members 
of a loyal opposition within the economic fraternity. 
To say that goods and cash are not "strictly" commensurate suggests 
that they are commensurate in some yet-to-be-determined way. To refer to 
the endowment effect as a "valuation ambiguity" falls short of an 
appreciation of value's complexity if there is a suggestion that less com-
plexity or a greater capacity to resolve it would eliminate the ambiguity. 
And the authors do suggest this. They attribute their faux 
incommensurability to their experimental subjects' inability to compute 
gains and losses. Thus they attribute the endowment effect to bounded 
rationality, rather than to the intrinsic features of value itself. The authors' 
failure to appreciate the cognitive complexity of valuation is corroborated 
by their reference, in a passage just preceding the one quoted above, to "the 
differences in preference or taste demonstrated by more than seven 
hundred participants in the experiments reported in this paper ... " (p. 226). 
The identification of value with "taste" is a classic error of the economist 
who conceives of value in Hobbesian, non-cognitivist terms, as a feeling, 
in response to an object, that varies only in intensity from one object to 
another.32 
Russell Korobkin's essay, Behavioral Economics, Contract 
Formation, and Contract Law (pp. 116-43), is strongly influenced by 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, and comes much closer than they do to 
articulating the full implications of the endowment effect. Korobkin brings 
a more sophisticated conception of value to bear on the problem, but he is, 
if anything, even more ambivalent about these implications than his 
predecessors. In spite of his apparent grasp of valuation's cognitive 
32. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 18, at 688-89 ("Initially, it is important to note that the 
incommensurability theme resonates tightly with one strand of utilitarian thought which insists that all 
values should be regarded as subjective and personal to the individual who holds them."). 
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dimensions, Korobkin also hesitates to depart from the orthodoxy of utility 
maximization. 
Korobkin conducted a series of experiments with law students that 
isolated the endowment effect in the context of contract negotiations (pp. 
117-29). He describes an experiment in which the law student participants 
were told that they represented a shipping company that was engaged in 
negotiations with a company that sold gift items, that the parties had agreed 
on a twenty dollars per package shipping price, and that their client sought 
a contract term that would limit its liability to reasonably foreseeable dam-
ages. In one trial, subjects were told that an industry form-contract con-
tained such a provision. The subjects were asked to state a per-unit price at 
which the client would be willing to surrender the clause and accept a full-
liability damages provision. In another trial, subjects were told that the in-
dustry form-contract contained a full-liability provision, and the subjects 
were asked to state a price at which the client would purchase a limited-
liability provision. As in the experiments by Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler concerning property rights, the seller's price greatly exceeded the 
buyer's price, indicating a tendency to hold on to endowments or to main-
tain a perceived status quo in a contracting situation. Refinements of this 
and the other experiments eliminated transaction costs, private information, 
and network benefits as explanations for the results (pp. 126-29). 
Korobkin advances an explanation for the endowment effect that rec-
ognizes the emotional basis of valuation, and that also recognizes the cog-
nitive dimensions of emotion and value. He attributes the endowment 
effect to the avoidance of regret, and describes regret as a complex, 
rationally articulated psychological phenomenon (pp. 129-33). According 
to Korobkin, regret arises from counterfactual thinking. In the process of 
constructing counterfactual scenarios, we find some aspects of reality more 
mutable than others. Stable background features such as earth's gravity, 
one's own identity, and social norms are relatively immutable, whereas 
abnormal events are highly mutable. Specifically, actions not taken are 
relatively immutable, whereas actions one has taken are relatively mutable. 
The mutability of actions taken means that counterfactuals are more readily 
constructed concerning one's actions as compared to one's inaction. The 
result is a greater likelihood that one will experience regret over an action 
taken than over an action not taken. Anticipation and avoidance of regret 
favors maintaining the status quo, resulting in the endowment effect. 
However, at the critical juncture of this inquiry, Korobkin's analysis is 
unpersuasive. He asks why the prospect of regret over an unfortunate 
decision should loom larger than the prospect of rejoicing over a fortunate 
one. In other words, why isn't the regret-based endowment effect canceled 
out by the equally likely possibility that one's actions will succeed instead 
of fail? Korobkin notes that the salience of regret is consistent with the 
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phenomenon of loss aversion, in which the apparent disutility of a down-
ward departure from a reference point is greater than the apparent utility of 
an upward departure of the same magnitude from the same reference point 
(p. 133).33 These phenomena are consistent; indeed, Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler treat loss aversion and the endowment effect as variants of a 
single phenomenon (p. 226). But Korobkin offers no explanation for either 
loss aversion or the salience ofregret. 
The difficulty is that Korobkin ignores what he knows about the cog-
nitive dimensions of regret. To frame the problem, as Korobkin does, as a 
question of "feelings of regret" versus "feelings of rejoicing" (p. 133), is to 
treat regret and rejoicing in simplistic Hobbesian terms, as a pain and a 
pleasure that mirror one another. It is to suppose that the relationship be-
tween the two emotions can only be a matter of one's outweighing or 
counteracting the other by its greater relative intensity. Instead, Korobkin 
ought to generalize the points he makes about regret, and recognize that all 
emotions are similarly rational and articulable. Emotions are not merely 
feelings that vary in intensity, but complex phenomena that can be 
reasoned about and rationally compared in many dimensions. If there is an 
explanation for the salience of regret in matters of choice, and a more com-
plete explanation for the endowment effect, then it lies in the intricacies of 
regret as compared to resignation, grievous loss, and defiant submission on 
the one hand, and satisfaction, vindication, rejoicing, and shameless 
gloating on the other. 
If Korobkin were to engage in a qualitative analysis of the values at 
issue, instead of the quantitative analysis he pursued up to this point, then 
he would no longer be engaged in doing economics. This point might be 
taken to be a reductio ad absurdum of my own argument, but to take it as 
such, and to dismiss this criticism of economics so lightly, would be a 
mistake. Korobkin has indeed arrived at a point at which it is impossible to 
continue to do economics. He recognizes that value has a cognitive dimen-
sion. His thesis is that the cognitive dimension of valuation, in particular 
the logic of regret, makes valuation context-dependent. The difficulty is 
that if value is context-dependent, then values are incommensurable. 
The connection between the context-dependence of valuation and the 
incommensurability of some values is the notion of value's intransitivity. 
Because values arise from diverse and discrete practical contexts, they 
often are intransitive.34 For example, Mary finds that winning the Van 
Cliburn competition is not better than becoming the national champion in 
the 200-meter backstroke. Becoming the Olympic champion in the 
33. Korobkin cites Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahnemann, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A 
Reference Dependent Model, 106 Q. J. EcoN. 1039 (1991). 
34. To say that values are intransitive means that if I find that A is not better than B, but C is 
preferable to B, it does not follow that C is preferable to A. 
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200-meter backstroke would be preferable to becoming the national 
champion, but this does not necessarily imply that becoming the Olympic 
champion in the 200-meter backstroke is preferable to winning the Van 
Cliburn competition. These alternatives are intransitive because they arise 
from radically different practical choice settings: art and sports.35 
Economists attribute the apparent incommensurability of some values to 
their being very close or roughly equal in value, and therefore difficult to 
choose between. In fact, it is their intransitivity that accounts for their 
incommensurability.36 In this example, the swimming alternatives are 
roughly equal in value, but the piano alternative is incommensurable with 
both swimming alternatives. Whereas roughly equal values can be 
analyzed in economic terms, genuine incommensurability of value renders 
economic analysis impossible because the theory of utility maximization 
depends entirely on the notion that preferences are transitive. 37 
This, then, is the situation. Korobkin, like Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler, has pursued the evidence where it leads. But his inquiry into the 
endowment effect has reached a point at which the simplifying assump-
tions of economics concerning the psychology of choice and action are an 
impediment to further understanding. To resist the next step in the analysis 
out of a perceived need to maintain the premises of economics, ,and the 
integrity of the discipline, can only deflect and distort the analysis. To ad-
here to the assumptions of utility maximization and the transitivity of pref-
erences when the evidence indicates that these assumptions cannot be 
maintained violates the principles of scientific inquiry. To pursue behav-
ioral economics is to discover good reasons not to do economics at all. 
We can only speculate upon the extent to which economists and legal 
economists who have examined the endowment effect recognize these im-
plications. At times, they seem strikingly obvious. For example, Korobkin 
writes that the assumption of exogeneity of preferences (that is, that there 
is no endowment effect) "is embedded deeply in the behavioral model of 
rational choice theory, which underlies the economic analysis of law" (pp. 
117-18). If preferences are not exogenous, but are instead endogenous to 
the practical choice situations that present them, then this implies that ra-
tional choice theory itself is at least questionable. Yet Korobkin does not 
question this model, even though his own experimental evidence showing 
35. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 55-56. 
36. RAz, supra note 6, at 328-35. 
37. Cf LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 69 (2d ed. 1972) ("A function U 
that thus arithmetizes the relation of preference among acts will be called a utility. It will be shown that 
the multiplicity of utilities is not complicated, every utility being simply related to every other."); 
James P. Spica, The Rationality of Normative Expectations, 24 J. CoNTEMP. L. 259, 277 n.74 (1998) 
("Ramsey's third axiom (concerning the transitivity of preference relations) is characteristically 
innocuous: 'If option A is equivalent [i.e., indifferent] to option Band B to C then A to C."') (citing F. 
P. Ramsey, Truth and Probability, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 52, 75 (0. H. Mellor ed., 1990)). 
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the weakness of the exogeneity of preferences thesis has given him every 
reason to do so. 
Ward Farnsworth's essay, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain 
After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral (pp. 302-21), demon-
strates that he is another member of the younger generation of legal 
economists who sees the implications of the Coase Theorem's demise, but 
does not see them clearly. Calabresi and Melamed ( as well as Coase) 
advance the theory that judgments that misallocate resources leave 
unrealized value on the bargaining table. Their analysis suggests that this 
value should be taken up and redistributed by post-judgment bargaining (p. 
302).38 If, due to high transaction costs or other market failures, this bar-
gaining cannot be expected to take place, then it is incumbent on courts to 
recognize the economically rational outcome and to effect it in the 
judgment. Farnsworth's essay relies on a small, unscientific sampling of 
actual nuisance cases to argue that post-judgment bargaining is unlikely 
ever to take place. In the cases he examined, the parties' lawyers invariably 
described such bargaining as foreclosed, not only by the level of animosity 
existing between the parties, but also by the way the parties valued the 
rights at issue in their litigation (p. 304). Several of the parties expressed a 
continuing belief in the right to use their land as they pleased. Most stated 
that they were uninterested in money, and some acted on this sentiment by 
turning down an offer by the other side to purchase their property outright. 
Farnsworth attributes the parties' acrimony to the absence of a 
depersonalizing market for the highly particular rights at issue, and to the 
resulting absence of pacifying market norms (pp. 311-12). Significantly, 
however, Farnsworth recognizes that this explanation does not reach the 
other impediments to post-judgment bargaining. He characterizes these 
other impediments as a distaste for bargaining, and he recognizes that this 
attitude is an aspect of the context-dependence of value. Farnsworth 
explains that: 
The "price" that the holder would state in such a situation is not a 
price for the rights per se, but rather reflects the cost of selling 
rights to a particular neighbor against the background of a 
particular history or context of beliefs and norms that makes cash 
bargaining uncomfortable. The parties were not thinking of their 
rights as bargaining chips and did not want to think that way about 
them. Their preferences and sense of value could have been 
flattened onto an accountant's spreadsheet, Mercator fashion, but 
would have been distorted by the process in a way that obliterated 
any bargaining range (p. 314). 
38. Farnsworth cites Coase, supra note 2, at 13; Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 
1115 (1972). 
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Farnsworth also recognizes that value is founded in emotion, noting: 
"To say there are no substitutes for a good is to make a statement about the 
way people feel about the good, not about the good itself' (p. 316). Given 
these features of value, Farnsworth recognizes that it is tautological to say 
that the parties would have bargained if different rights had been at issue, 
or if robust markets for these rights had existed, or if the parties felt 
differently about their rights. Each of these propositions amounts to no 
more than an empty supposition that the parties would have behaved dif-
ferently with regard to the values at issue if different values had been at 
issue (p. 316). 
Farnsworth is to be credited for his sensitivity to the context-
dependence of value, but his insights leave him without any explanation for 
the parties' behavior. Previous generations of economists and legal 
economists hardly were unaware of the fact that actual bargaining after 
judgment is unlikely. Even though they attributed these failures to bargain 
to market failures, such as high transaction costs, presumably they were no 
less aware than Farnsworth that people can be stubborn and vindictive. But 
they did not draw the conclusions from this that Farnsworth draws, because 
traditional economic analysis contains a subtext that explains away the 
context-dependence of value as Farnsworth presents it, and that threatens 
to swallow Farnsworth's analysis whole. 
The economist, like his utilitarian forebears, is at heart an essentialist. 
The point of ignoring high transaction costs, incomplete information, and 
other features ofless-than-ideal markets is to reach what he perceives to be 
underlying market mechanisms. The essentials of markets must be grasped 
before society can intelligently identify and eliminate market failures, 
reduce inefficiency, and maximize social welfare. Individual decision 
making is also subject to this essentialist enterprise. PeQple's assessments 
of value are, at bottom, emotional reactions. Like other emotional 
reactions, judgments about value can be confused and confusing, and may 
cause people to fail to recognize and pursue their own long-term welfare. 
As with markets, it is important to get down to essentials. Problems in in-
dividual decision making can be analyzed by looking at the essentials of 
emotion and value, which for the economist consist of pleasure versus 
pain: to fail to maximize one's pleasure over the long term is simply 
irrational. This simple, seemingly irrefutable core of practical reasoning 
provides, to the economist's way of thinking, an uncontroversial and 
uniquely reliable basis for public policy. 
Nothing in the economist's enterprise, so conceived, is inconsistent 
with the context-dependence of value. Granted that value arises from par-
ticulars, we can nevertheless abstract from particulars. We can 
intellectually extract not only pleasure and pain from the welter of 
emotions, but also the essence of rational behavior from the welter of 
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context-sensitive valuations and emotionally grounded motivations. 
According to the traditional economist, the essence of rational behavior is 
to optimize pleasure. To fail to put sufficient thought into this task, to fail 
to distinguish the essential from the inessential in one's present circum-
stances, is just another aspect of economic irrationality. Farnsworth's liti-
gants certainly were embedded in their particular practical choice settings. 
But to the extent that they failed to rise above them ( to generalize, to be 
objective, to take the long view) they were irrational. This kind of practical 
reasoning has no role to play in sound public policy analysis. 
Farnsworth concedes too much to the traditional economic argument 
when he allows that the nuisance case parties' heeding their context-
dependent evaluations was irrational. He writes: 
It may not be possible to state one price that the owner of an 
entitlement places on it; its value may depend on who is asking and 
why, and on what sort of statement the parties would be making 
about the right, and about themselves, by entering into a cash 
transaction for it. These are instances of human complexity. 
Whether they are instances of irrationality in either a lay or 
economic sense is another and more difficult question (p. 314). 
The answer to this more difficult question is that the parties were not be-
having irrationally, except in an economic sense, and that this demonstrates 
a fatal shortcoming in the economic sense of rationality. 
Farnsworth need not concede even the possibility that the parties' be-
havior is irrational. The foregoing economic argument against 
Farnsworth's position rests on the skeleton of value thesis: the notion that 
the assumption of utility maximization captures the essentials of sound 
practical reasoning and creates a uniquely reliable set of economic impli-
cations, even if the value thesis fails to capture all of human practical 
reasoning. When Farnsworth recognizes that the valuations of his nuisance 
litigants are legitimate because they are context-dependent, he recognizes, 
in effect, that the skeleton of value thesis is a fallacy. Many valuations do 
not call for maximization as a rational response; they call instead for ex-
pression, or fidelity, or nurturing.39 These non-optimizing responses are 
neither irrational nor reducible to "real" value; nor are they aesthetic re-
sponses to "real" value. The supposition that non-optimizing behavior is 
any of these things, and that it safely can be ignored in both descriptive and 
prescriptive analyses of human behavior is to misunderstand the nature of 
value and practical reasoning. 
Whether because of a reluctance to discard the axioms of economic 
thought or for other reasons, Farnsworth, like Korobkin, fails to appreciate 
the full implications of context dependence and to break free from the 
skeleton of value fallacy. As a result, he overlooks the critical feature of his 
39. See authorities cited supra note 6. 
558 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:537 
nuisance cases, the tragic dimension of value. When the values at issue in a 
practical choice setting are incommensurable, as they are bound to be in 
cases involving land, then a choice between competing values necessarily 
leaves value unrealized or uncompensated for. This is the tragic dimension 
of value, and economics will always fall short of explaining it. The 
judgments in these cases are imperfect resolutions of the conflicts at their 
core, but no subsequent negotiations can produce a better result. The 
choices implicit in the judgments inevitably leave value unrealized, pre-
cisely because the values behind the conflicts are context dependent. The 
premises of economic thought ignore the features of value that give rise to 
its tragic dimension. The pretense that all value nevertheless is reduced and 
incorporated into economic analysis precludes any acknowledgment of this 
deficiency. 
III 
FAIRNESS AND FAULT 
What difference does it make to law or legal theory if economics rests 
on the skeleton of value fallacy? It renders economics incapable of giving a 
persuasive account of core legal concepts, such as fairness and fault. It 
causes us to overlook the impossibility of eliminating ex post determina-
tions of value and, as a consequence, to fail to appreciate fully the role of 
adjudication in law. And it leads to an overemphasis on states of affairs, 
and a blindness to the law's efforts to shape character and to assess the 
quality of individuals' practical reasoning. Both fairness and fault have far 
more to do with the ongoing construction of personal and social identities 
than they do with the production and distribution of social welfare. 
Ultimately, these considerations lead to the conclusion that we ought to 
abandon the consequentialist model in legal theory,40 and make use of the 
quite different tradition in philosophical ethics known as virtue ethics.41 
In the lead essay in Behavioral Law and Economics, Jolls, Thaler, and 
Sunstein consider the ultimatum game and the importance of fairness to 
40. By "the consequentialist model in legal theory" I mean the pervasive assumption that all law 
is a system of incentive structures designed to induce self-interested individuals to produce certain 
policy outcomes through the use of instrumental reasoning. See infra notes 60 and 61 and 
accompanying text. 
41. One should not be put off from the notion of virtue ethics legal theory by the colloquial 
meaning of the word "virtue." It does not denote a rigid morality. In philosophical ethics, the word 
"virtue" refers to self-governance at the level of motivation by means of the conscious cultivation of 
one's values, attitudes, and propensities. The principal characteristic of a person of virtue is sound 
practical judgment: the capacity to do the right thing in any given context because one perceives, 
values, and pursues the good as it presents itself in particular circumstances. This quality of judgment 
is the focus of virtue ethics, and it stands in direct contrast to a doctrine of moral duties. See Kyron 
Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1423, 1449-56 (1995) [hereinafter Inculpation]. 
Virtue ethics legal theory consists mostly of a rigorous examination of the ways in which the law relies 
on individuals' internalizing the law. 
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practical reasoning (pp. 21-26). A simple version of the ultimatum game 
involves two players and a sum of money. The players are told that if they 
can agree on how to divide the money, they can keep it. However, 
negotiations are limited to one round: one proposal by one player and one 
acceptance or rejection by the other. If the Responder rejects the Proposer's 
offer, neither player gets anything. According to rational choice theorists, 
the Proposer will offer the smallest unit of currency into which the sum can 
be divided, and the Responder will accept it. It is better from the 
Responder's point of view to receive a penny than to receive nothing, and 
it is obviously preferable from the Proposer's point of view to take as much 
of the pot as he possibly can. 
The problem for rational choice theory is that real players almost 
never play the game this way. Instead, Proposers usually offer a fair por-
tion of their windfall, at least 20% and usually about 40% to 50%, and 
Responders reject offers lower than this. Reputation effects don't account 
for these results, because the game is a one-time event, often played 
anonymously. Repeated trials that might allow for learning do not lead to 
different results. 
Jolls, Thaler, and Sunstein attribute these results to bounded self-
interest and, specifically, the pursuit of fairness. They define a fair result as 
one that does not depart substantially from a "reference transaction": some 
benchmark position of the parties (p. 26). In the simple version of the 
ultimatum game, the reference transaction is the parties' entry into the 
game with equal rights to the game's windfall. Jolls, Thaler, and Sunstein 
contend that players in the ultimatum game hew to the reference transac-
tion because they value fairness. Elaborating their notion of bounded self-
interest, the authors describe this commitment to fairness as a set of prefer-
ences that includes a preference for the well-being of some others and a 
preference for ''what kind of person [one] wish[ es] to be" (p. 25). 
This analysis is unsatisfactory because its principal points are contra-
dictory. First, the authors refer to "substantial" departures from the 
reference transaction as unfair (p. 26), but of course the issue is more com-
plex than this. A better way to put the point would be to ask whether there 
has been an ''unreasonable" departure from the reference transaction. If 
players were told that they would play two rounds of the ultimatum game, 
switching roles after the first round, then it would be perfectly fair for the 
Proposer to offer the Responder a penny. This would be a substantial 
departure from the reference position, but the prospect of a second round 
would make it eminently reasonable and fair. In this game, the reasonable 
and fair division also would be an equal division, but this is not always the 
case. In the original version of the ultimatum game, an offer of anything 
over twenty percent appears to the players to be reasonable and fair. This is 
not an equal division; it is a proportionate division. If fairness is a 
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reasonably proportionate departure from a reference transaction, then the 
question is how this proportionality is determined. As Jolls, Thaler, and 
Sunstein seem to recognize, it has to be determined by reference to the 
practical context in which the issue arises (p. 26). There is no context-
independent answer to a question such as, "What is a reasonable 
proportion?" 
However, the authors undercut their own insight when they describe 
fairness in terms that fit the skeleton of value thesis. They describe the 
concern for fairness as the product of a preference for others' welfare and a 
preference for a character one can live with, and not as the product of con-
cern for others' welfare or concern for one's character. The point of 
framing these concerns as preferences is to make them amenable to 
economic analysis. A preference for others' welfare is a utility function 
like any utility function: a preference for a defensible character can be 
plotted on an indifference curve, and so on (p. 24). This move echoes the 
authors' description of bounded self-interest as "an important fact about the 
utility function of most people: They care, or act as if they care, about 
others ... ," discussed in Part 1 (p. 16). These passages imply that selfless 
behavior ultimately can be reduced to self-interested behavior. 
Furthermore, they imply a reduction of incommensurable, context-
dependent value to commensurable, context-independent value where 
"desires compete with others in a world of scarce resources" (p. 25). The 
authors do not deny that people genuinely do behave in selfless ways, but 
they suggest that this behavior can be translated into the terms of economic 
analysis without a loss of significance. 
In short, one of the authors' two points about fairness recognizes 
irreducible, context-dependent, and incommensurable value, while the 
other point implies that all value can be reduced to the maximization of 
context-independent utility. Both of these things cannot be true. If our con-
cern for the welfare of others can be reduced to preferences, then the ques-
tion of reasonable proportionality involved in fairness can be resolved by 
the standard techniques of economic analysis. If the context-dependence of 
value places the reasonable proportionality of fairness beyond the reach of 
economic analysis, then our concerns for the welfare of others and for a 
defensible character are not reducible to preferences. Put another way, if 
one recognizes the deficiencies in the economic account of practical 
reasoning, then what is the point of packaging the newly recognized, more 
complex human values as "preferences" and inserting them back into an 
unmodified analytical framework of utility maximization? 
Elsewhere, these authors strongly endorse the notion of context-
dependent value, and argue that economics must come to terms with it, at 
the cost of a loss of parsimony (pp. 20-21 ). It seems then, that they do not 
want to say that a concern for fairness reflects preferences for others' 
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welfare and one's own character; preferences that are to be optimized in 
commensuration with one's other preferences. Instead, they want to say 
that fairness reflects genuine concerns for others' welfare and for our own 
character, concerns that we can and do pursue on their own terms and for 
their own sake. A new kind of economics will not help us to understand 
this latter enterprise; it is not amenable to economic analysis at all. Because 
these concerns are context-dependent, they require us to compare and 
choose between incommensurable values, and to cope with the tragic 
dimension of value that attends incommensurability. Economics has noth-
ing to do with such an enterprise because it does not acknowledge the pos-
sibility of such an enterprise. 
An example will illustrate this point. Questions of fairness arise in the 
criminal law in connection with the proportionality of punishment. When 
we ask whether a mentally retarded offender ought to suffer the death pen-
alty, for instance, we ask whether the infliction of the most severe punish-
ment possible would be fair in light of the offender's limited capacities.42 
In Jolls, Thaler, and Sunstein's terms, the reference transaction is the 
execution of an offender with normal mental capacities, and the question is 
whether the execution of a person with substantially less mental capacity is 
a reasonable or unreasonable departure from this benchmark. In order to 
answer this question, legislators and jurors must ask whether condemning 
such a person to death is consistent with their sense of themselves and of 
their society as a civilization.43 This much of the analysis is apparent to the 
authors. 
The next steps, however, elude them. Regardless of which answer 
legislators or jurors give to the question of proportionate punishment for 
the mentally retarded, something will be lost. They face a tragic choice.44 If 
they do not authorize the execution of the killer, then they will accord less 
honor and sympathy to the victim than her surviving family expects. If they 
do authorize the execution of a mentally retarded person, then they will fail 
to separate us from our forebears who killed what they hated, feared, and 
could not understand. There is no optimal solution, because this tragic 
dimension is intrinsic to value itself. Furthermore, compounding this tragic 
dimension, the answer to this question is constitutive: it will reflect the 
character of the individual juror or legislator, and of the society that she 
represents, but it also will determine that character.45 As Aristotle 
42. Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1195 (2000). The fairness or 
eligibility-for-punishment aspect of the offender's culpability is distinguishable from the fault or mens 
rea aspect of the offender's culpability. Id. at 1228-30. The proportionality of a death sentence depends 
on the relationship between these two aspects of culpability. Id. at 1254-57. 
43. See id. at 1282. 
44. E.g., David Stout, Coun to Hear Appeal From Texas Death Row Inmate, N.Y. TIMES 
(November 27, 2000), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11 /27/national/27CND-SCOT.html. 
45. Huigens, supra note 42, at 1254-57. 
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recognized, character is a function of practical choice.46 We can be no 
better and no worse than our chosen path so far enables us to be. As a 
result, far more rides on this choice than the fate of the mentally retarded 
murderer. We define ourselves, individually and in the aggregate as a 
society, by how we frame and make this tragic choice.47 
These issues are all well beyond the limited resources of economics, 
behavioral or otherwise. To frame the question of fairness in the execution 
of the mentally retarded as a preference for a character that one can live 
with, and the execution or sparing of the offender as the optimal 
satisfaction of this preference, improperly flattens out the competing values 
and our ultimate choices, Mercator-fashion. To package incommensurate 
values for economic analysis in this way leaves out the tragic dimension of 
value and overlooks the role of individual judgment in coping with the 
context-dependence, intransitivity, and incommensurability of value that 
give rise to it. Because she focuses exclusively on the production of opti-
mal states of affairs, the legal economist ignores the ways in which the law 
copes with the tragic dimension of value by its attention to matters of 
individual practical judgment. 
These defects are especially apparent in connection with fault. Jeffrey 
Rachlinski's essay, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in 
Hindsight (pp. 95-115), examines the phenomenon of hindsight bias. 
Viewed retrospectively, most events seem inevitable and predictable, when 
in fact they were neither. This "20/20 hindsight" causes people judging ex 
post to overestimate the ex ante probability that the past event would occur. 
The implications of this phenomenon for negligence liability seem 
obvious: juries sometimes will find fault because they think a defendant 
"should have known" something was likely to occur, when in fact the 
defendant could not have known without the benefit,ofhindsight. 
The hindsight bias implicit in negligence liability can be economically 
inefficient in two different ways. A certain degree of hindsight bias might 
46. ARISTOTLE, N1coMACHEAN ETHICS Il.l.1103a-ll03b, II.4.ll05a-ll05b, Il.6.1107b, 
X.9.l 179b-ll80a (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1962) (describing the acquisition of virtue as a 
fixed disposition toward the good); see also M. F. Bumyeat, Aristotle on Leaming to be Good, in 
ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 69, 74 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980) (describing the process of 
habituation to virtue); L. A. Kosman, Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's 
Ethics, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS, supra, at 103, 108-09 (describing virtue as action from 
proper motives, construed as emotional states); John McDowell, Deliberation and Moral Development 
in Aristotle's Ethics, in ARISTOTLE, KANT, AND THE STOICS: RETHINKING HAPPINESS AND DUTY 19, 
21-23 (Stephen Engstrom & Jennifer Whiting eds., 1996) ( describing practical reasoning and doing 
well in the context of habituation to virtue). 
47. Remarkably, much of this complexity is captured in the phrase the Supreme Court has used to 
frame this issue for Eighth Amendment pwposes. The question is whether the punishment can be 
reconciled with our "evolving standards of decency." See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, IOI (1958) 
(plurality opinion) (framing the evolving standards of decency test); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 302 (1989) (applying the evolving standards of decency test to the constitutionality of the 
execution ofa mentally retarded offender). 
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lead to an inefficient excess of precaution. If the bias is sufficiently pro-
nounced, then its effects will resemble strict liability, which generally does 
not result in inefficient levels of precaution, but which can overdeter by 
raising costs to prohibitive levels (pp. 100-03). Rachlinski concludes: "A 
system that produced unbiased judgments would, therefore, avoid one of 
two adverse economic consequences of the hindsight bias" (p. 102). True 
to its origins in the skeleton of value fallacy, this analysis distorts or omits 
two critically important aspects of negligence. 
First, Rachlinski overemphasizes the importance of probability as a 
feature of negligence. Negligence is a species of fault, and fault is an 
aspect of wrongdoing.48 No one would say I was negligent if I were to 
misjudge the probability of my hitting a golf ball into the rough. I wouid be 
negligent, however, if I were to misjudge the probability of my hitting a 
golf ball through the window of a nearby house. Furthermore, fault is 
inferred from the particular circumstances and manner in which harm is 
inflicted or wrongdoing is done. To misjudge the probability of harm or 
wrongdoing is only one way in which a person can be negligent. I might 
negligently hit a golf ball through the window of a nearby house because I 
misjudged the probability of my strike going awry, but I would be equally 
negligent if I failed to notice the house at all. 
Rachlinski's focus on probabilities might seem to be a defensible sim-
plification of negligence, but it suffers from the skeleton of value fallacy. 
Probabilities have to do with the likelihood of future events, and the 
analysis of probabilities and their estimation fits comfortably into 
economics' consequentialist framework. Consequentialism, as the name 
implies, is inveterately forward looking. But it hardly follows from this 
convenient circumstance that the inaccurate estimation of probabilities 
constitutes any necessary or sufficient feature of negligence. The assess-
ment of fault by judges and juries is primarily a retrospective affair that 
involves an analysis of every aspect of the defendant's practical judgment, 
including not only the quality of his instrumental reasoning but also the 
propriety of his chosen ends.49 The analysis of negligence is almost certain 
to be distorted by a focus on those aspects of judgment, such as the 
48. Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARYL. REv. 943, 
971-80 (2000). 
49. Huigens, Inculpation , supra note 41 , at 1475-76; Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Criminal 
Negligence, 1 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 431, 455-57 (1998). This point probably accounts for the notorious 
inability of the law and economics movement to develop any viable conception of fault that is not 
parasitic on traditional categories. See Huigens, supra note 48, at 958-84 (describing this failure in the 
deterrence theory of punishment); see also Jules L. Coleman, Crime, Kickers, and Transaction 
Structures, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE 313, 323-26 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) 
(arguing that the concept of fault simply is absent from economics); Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, 
Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315,320 
n.11 (1984) (noting that the economic analysis of crime suggests "no inherent reason why crimes 
themselves should be defined with respect to any mental element"). 
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estimation of probabilities, that are limited to instrumental reasoning and 
that have a predominantly prospective orientation. 
This distortion can be subtle. For example, Rachlinski argues that fear 
of hindsight bias in negligence litigation might explain isolated bans on 
negligence liability, such as the business judgment rule. In some areas, the 
effects of hindsight bias might be particularly damaging. Rachlinski writes: 
"We might want doctors, lawyers, or accountants to guarantee their work 
with a system of de facto strict liability, or take an occasional excess of 
precautions, but corporate managers operating under such a regime will be 
apt to betray the real interests of their shareholders" (p. 111). This seems to 
be a plausible account of the origins of the doctrine. It would be a mistake, 
however, to accept it as a reason to expand the application of the business 
judgment rule. Negligence liability might still be appropriate for a 
corporate manager whose wrongdoing has nothing to do with the assess-
ment of probabilities and whose trial and liability would be unaffected by 
hindsight bias. Managers, like golfers, can simply fail to see as well as fail 
to judge properly. They also can fail to adopt defensible objectives.50 
Second, Rachlinski's references to the results of an unbiased justice 
system treat adjudication as merely incident to the administration of static, 
value-promoting rules. This ignores the constitutive role of adjudication in 
justice. To the extent that Rachlinski appreciates the context-dependence of 
value, this ought to make the constitutive role of adjudication obvious to 
him and to other behavioral economists. Consider, for example, the juror 
who must decide whether to execute the mentally retarded offender. The 
question is one of fairness, and to say, as Jolls, Thaler, and Sunstein seem 
to do, that such decisions are context-dependent is to say that each decision 
is unique, and underdetermined by the applicable rules of decision. The 
final determination of fairness takes place only in the judgment of the 
decision maker who has the requisite legal authority, in the typical capital 
case, the jury. It is in this sense that adjudication is constitutive of justice. 
The constitutive role of adjudication is a prominent feature of 
negligence. Negligence is unique as a species of fault because the content 
and parameters of the standard of due care are determined at the same time 
and in the same manner as the question of whether that standard has been 
50. E.g. , In re Caremark Int'! Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68, 971-72 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(indicating that directors' failure to pay due attention might not be protected by the business judgment 
rule); see also William T. Allen, 20th Century Evolution and Growth of Delaware Corporation Law, 17 
DEL. LAW. 16 (1999) ("In ultimately adopting an intermediate standard-reasonableness in light of 
some goal-in Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., [637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)], the 
Delaware Supreme Court willingly inserted courts more readily into the business of substantive review 
of decisions."); Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in 
Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1213, 1225 n.53 (2000) (citing Caremark and noting 
increased vigilance over business judgment in state courts). 
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violated, after the fact and by the legally authorized decision maker at trial. 
In this sense, adjudication is constitutive of negligence. 
Because adjudication is constitutive of negligence, Rachlinski's ideal 
of an unbiased justice system is questionable. It is not entirely clear that 
hindsight is not itself a constitutive feature of negligence. Adjudication is 
constitutive of fault because fault is context-dependent: we infer from the 
specific manner and circumstances in which wrongdoing occurred that the 
rationale behind the legal rule that has been violated is fully implicated. 
Otherwise, the imposition of the legal consequences of the rule's violation 
might not be justified.st In cases of negligence, however, there is no rule; 
there is only the unspecified standard of due care. Hindsight might well 
have a positive value in the determination of negligence, because the task 
of abstracting society's interests and expectations from a highly fluid series 
of practical decisions and consequences threatens to be an overwhelming 
one. Hindsight bias might have a compensating effect, exaggerating subtle 
social values and interests that otherwise might be overlooked and left un-
protected. 52 
These two points against Rachlinski can be generalized to indicate a 
promising new direction for legal theory, given the deficiencies of both 
traditional law and economics and its behavioral economics progeny. Once 
one recognizes that the context-dependence of value entails intransitivity, 
incommensurability, and a tragic dimension in value, then the importance 
of sound practical judgment in coping with this complexity becomes 
increasingly apparent. Legal theory might be framed around the 
governance of practical reasoning generally, including not only matters of 
choice and action, but of value and motive as well. The analysis of fault, in 
particular, is best framed in this way. 
In criminal law theory, economists and legal economists sympathetic 
to the themes of Behavioral Law and Economics have pursued such an 
approach. They have described the law's role in "preference-shaping" and 
the implications of this phenomenon for criminal fault and the governance 
of conduct generally.53 However, the same contradiction that has been ex-
amined in this review comes to the fore: If one recognizes the deficiencies 
in the economic account of practical reasoning, then there is no point in 
packaging the newly recognized, more complex human values as 
51 . Huigens, supra note 48, at 1028-31. 
52. For example, to disallow the defense of mistake of fact regarding consent in rape cases results 
in negligence liability. This liability can be defended on the ground that it bolsters a woman's right to 
refuse sex, and counteracts patriarchal tendencies that undermine that right. See Douglas N. Husak & 
George C. Thomas III, Date Rape, Social Convention and Reasonable Mistakes, 11 LAW & PHIL. 95, 
125 (1992). 
53 . E.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-
Shaping Policy, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1, 24-37; Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 6, at 597; Dan M. 
Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse-But only for the Virtuous, 96 M1cH. L. REv. 127, 141 (1997). 
566 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:537 
"preferences" and inserting them back into an unmodified analytical 
framework of utility maximization. 54 
To give recent insights concerning context-dependence in valuation 
their due, one must break with consequentialism all together, and appeal 
instead to the tradition in philosophical ethics that has always centered on 
the governance of individuals at the level of valuation and motivation. This 
tradition is virtue ethics:55 the philosophy of Aristotle rather than Bentham 
or Kant. 56 The notion of virtue ethics legal theory instantly raises specters 
of puritanical brainwashing or an insidious legislative agenda dominated 
by prudes and prohibitionists. But it is none of these things. Virtue ethics 
legal theory is simply a matter of taking advantage of an ancient tradition 
in philosophical ethics, in the same way that legal theory has taken 
advantage of the insights of consequentialism at least since the time of 
Holmes. 
In the matter of fault, for example, a virtue ethics theory of punish-
ment interprets fault as an inference, drawn from the particular manner and 
circumstances of the defendant's wrongdoing, to the effect that his 
practical reasoning is deficient or flawed. 57 This inference justifies the 
punishment of the accused, not only because of its relationship to the pro-
hibition at issue, but more generally because the justifying purpose of 
criminal law is the inculcation of sound practical judgment, a quality which 
is also known as virtue. The determination of fault brings the justification 
for the criminal prohibition to bear upon the individual case of punishment 
in a justifying way. This is why criminal fault is not merely a side con-
straint on punishment, but also an affirmative, justifying reason to punish. 
Second, a recognition of the importance of judgment in coping with 
the tragic dimension of value should lead to a greater appreciation for 
adjudication. Because value is context-dependent, many choices are unique 
and underdetermined by any conceivable rules of decision. This makes the 
judgments of legal decision makers constitutive of justice in individual 
cases. The implications of this change of perspective are subtle but poten-
tially important. For example, jurors in capital cases may currently be in-
structed that sympathy must play no role in their decision on the execution 
of the offender.58 The Supreme Court's decision authorizing these instruc-
tions assumes, as consequentialist legal theory tends to do, that the jury is 
54. See supra pp. 561 -62 Huigens, supra note 48, at 1004-07 (advancing a similar argument 
against Lawrence Lessig's version of this economic argument). 
55. See generally Roger Crisp & Michael Slote, Introduction , in VIRTUE ETHICS, I, 3-4 (Roger 
Crisp & Michael Slote eds., 1997) (describing virtue ethics as third major tradition in philosophical 
ethics that has been revived as an alternative to consequentialism and Kantian deontological morality). 
56. Huigens, supra note 48, at 1019-21 ; Huigens, lnculpation, supra note 41, passim 
(summarizing Aristotelian ethics and applying them to the theory of punishment). 
57. Huigens, supra note 48, at 985-88; Huigens, lnculpation, supra note 41, at 1462-67. 
58. Same V. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990). 
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merely an administrative body that is most reasonable and fair when it 
applies legal rules in a rote and dispassionate manner. The opinion does not 
exhibit even a rudimentary understanding of human valuation and 
judgment, nor any inkling of the constitutive role of the jury in a just 
decision. 
Virtue ethics legal theory, had it been sufficiently developed to be of 
use to the Justices, might have made a difference in this case.59 The 
criminal law is concerned not only with the virtue of offenders and poten-
tial offenders, as it is in the matter of fault, but also with the virtue of the 
punishing majority. When, in our collective legal capacity, we consider 
whether or not to punish an individual, we are concerned, not only with the 
offender's practical judgment and his set of standing motivations, but also 
with our own judgments, motivations, and characters, both individually and 
as a society. We will not punish in some cases even if it might be effective 
to do so, if to punish in this way would make us a brutal society instead of 
an enlightened one. These questions are acute in a capital case, and the jury 
asks and answers them for us all. To ask the jury to decide them 
dispassionately is to misunderstand the nature of adjudication. 
CONCLUSION 
The dream of a complete reduction of practical reasoning to the 
maximization of utility is a legacy of the reformist spirit of Jeremy 
Bentham.60 To cut away the tradition, to bum off the superstition, to over-
come the inertia that caused so much injustice and poverty in his day were 
admirable goals that were well served by an exclusive attention to conse-
quences. But we now occupy a position two hundred years after Bentham, 
and one hundred years after Holmes brought this way of thinking to bear 
on the law.61 Their enterprise has run up against its natural limits. There are 
non-consequential values and responses to value that are neither intuitions 
nor traditions, neither superstitions nor a priori phantoms. We cannot do 
without such things as caring for others, nurturing a virtuous character, and 
honoring family and friends. We would risk doing positive harm to society 
if we were to eliminate all recognition of these things from law, and all 
understanding of them from legal theory. 
The contributors to Behavioral Law and Economics each understand 
this situation to one degree or another. I suspect that they hope to refine 
59. Some of the justices in Saffle, e.g., 479 U.S. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and in an earlier 
case on a similar issue, California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987), displayed a considerably more 
sophisticated grasp of the relationship between law and emotion. 
60. E.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 20-21 (Prometheus 
Books 1988) (1782) (arguing that principles other than utility lead to overcriminalization and excessive 
severity in punishment). 
61. See, e.g., 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 39-51 (The Legal Classics Library 1982) 
(1881) (stating a consequentialist theory of punishment and contrasting it to retributivism). 
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homo economicus, and are willing to sacrifice parsimony to do so, not only 
to make the economic analysis of the law more "realistic" but also make a 
place in that tradition for humane values beyond the humane values of the 
marketplace. The difficulty is that they still cling to the tools of 
consequentialism. Bentham's consequentialist agenda and axioms have 
already succeeded to the extent that they can, and fidelity to his spirit now 
requires an entirely new approach that gives nonconsequential value its 
due, recognizes it where it persists in the law, and incorporates it into legal 
theory on its own terms. The conservative strategy of packaging 
nonconsequential values as preferences for nonconsequential values, and 
then proceeding with conventional economic analysis, is the strategy that 
prevails in Behavioral Law and Economics. It is a strategy that is bound to 
fail. 
